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Ryanair is now Europe’s largest low-cost airline. It is also one of the most 
controversial, due to its outspoken boss, its cost-containment strategies, and its hostile 
relations with organized labor. Ryanair has consistently denied accusations that it is 
antiunion, stating that it respects the right of workers to organize and even claiming to 
be a champion of its employees’ right to non-unionization. However, this claim does 
not hold up in the face of extensive evidence of union suppression. This article 
addresses such evidence, particularly, the various methods by which Ryanair has 
avoided and suppressed unions. In Ireland, Ryanair successfully crushed an 
organizing campaign by the country’s largest union, the Services, Industrial, 
Professional and Technical Union, after a lengthy and bitter strike. The only other 
union continuing to challenge Ryanair is the Irish Airline Pilots Association. 
However, its efforts recently suffered a major setback when the Supreme Court ruled 
that Ryanair’s nonunion “employee representative committees” were a form of 
collective bargaining, allowing the company to affirm its nonunion status. 
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While one finds extensive literature on the decline in unionization and increase in 
employer opposition to unions in many developed countries, unionization in the 
airline industry has remained generally robust (Johnson 2001; Hirsh and Macpherson 
2000). This has even been the case among many operators that pursue a low-fares/ 
low-cost business strategy, for example, Easyjet in the United Kingdom, Goodjet in 
Sweden, Virgin Blue in Australia, and Southwest Airlines in the United States. 
Ryanair, a multinational company of Irish origin that has spearheaded low-cost air 
travel in Europe, provides a notable exception. It has persistently refused to recognize 
or deal with trade unions. Ryanair is now Europe’s largest, and still growing, low-cost 
airline. It is also a controversial company, due largely to its outspoken boss, Michael 
O’Leary; its various strategies to contain or cut costs; and its hostile relationship with 
trade unions. This article addresses the multiple strategies used by the competing 
parties (trade unions and Ryanair management) during their long-running and highly 
publicized confrontations.  
 
We begin by examining labor relations in the airline industry, with particular 
emphasis on the emergence of low-cost airlines. We then review some issues of 
context, notably, the legal framework relating to trade union recognition in Ireland, 
and provide a brief description of the unions that sought to organize in Ryanair. The 
remainder of the article analyzes disputes between Ryanair and trade unions in Ireland 
with some discussion of union activities in other European countries. Data for the 
analysis are derived from documentary sources, such as the Irish Labour Court, High 
Court, and Supreme Court, as well as from interviews with officials from the Irish 
Airline Pilots Association (IALPA) and the umbrella body for trade unions, the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions. We requested interviews with management representatives 
in Ryanair but were unsuccessful in this regard. 
 
Labor Relations in the Airline Industry 
The past three decades have seen significant changes in the airline industry. 
Liberalization of air travel had resulted in a move away from the state-owned model 
of air travel to the emergence of low-cost carriers, such as Ryanair. The state-owned 
model was associated with a monopoly position, and because of the absence of 
competitive pressures, employees generally enjoyed job security, attractive pay and 
conditions, and extensive collective bargaining (Blyton et al. 2001). In contrast, the 
business model of low-cost airlines, based on a cost leadership strategy, has been 
associated with comparatively poorer terms and conditions of employment (cf. 
Binggeli and Pompeo 2002; Campbell and Kinglsey-Jones 2002; Doganis 2001; 
International Transport Workers Federation [ITF] 2002; Lawton 2003; Strategic 
Direction 2006). Other changes in the airline industry, including privatization, 
globalization, economic downturns, rising fuel prices, and international terrorism, 
have placed intense pressure on airlines to reduce operating costs. Since labor 
represents a significant proportion of such costs, employees and their unions have felt 
the brunt of cost-cutting strategies. These have included greater work intensification, 
less job security, fewer breaks, lower earnings, pay freezes, introduction of two-tier 
pay systems,  and increased atypical employment contracts (cf. Blyton et al. 2001; 
Boyd 2001; Broughton 2005). These strategies have been introduced despite 
relatively strong unionization particularly when compared to other service industries, 
such as hotels, restaurants, and cleaning. Unionization is estimated at 40 percent of 
overall air transport employees and over 60 percent of non-managerial employees of 
major airlines (Johnson 2001; Hirsh and Macpherson 2000). Even 70 percent of low-
cost carriers recognize trade unions (ITF 2002). Boyd (2001, 442) argues that “moves 
by major European airlines to sub-contract work to lower paid, less well trained staff 
appear to run contrary to virtuous ‘mission’ statements, and could be interpreted as a 
clear signal that, in reality, cost takes precedence over quality.” Worryingly for trade 
unions, these cost containment strategies are increasingly being introduced 
unilaterally, with management bypassing established channels of consultation (Blyton 
et al. 2001). The problems facing airline employees are likely to be exacerbated where 
they do not have any union voice, and particularly where the airline adopts a union 
suppression strategy, such as in Ryanair. 
 
Contemporary and Legal Context to Union Recognition Disputes in Ireland 
Before addressing union recognition and avoidance in Ryanair, it is necessary to 
provide some background on the Irish context. Union density in Ireland reached its 
peak (62 percent) in 1980 but has been in decline ever since (Gunnigle, O’Sullivan, 
and Kinsella 2002). In 2004, union density was 35 percent, representing a fall of over 
27 percentage points since 1980 (CSO 2005). While numerous factors have 
contributed to this decline, of particular pertinence to our analysis is the hardening of 
employer opposition to conceding union recognition. While initially most evident 
among American multinationals from the early 1980s, employer opposition has since 
become more diffuse: 
 
While the early nonunion firms were predominantly US-owned and located 
primarily among “high-tech” firms, more recent evidence from the early 1990s 
points to a broader diffusion of union avoidance to embrace both Irish and 
other foreign-owned firms, and a broader range of industrial sectors. 
(Gunnigle, Collings, and Morley 2006, 282)  
Research has identified a range of management strategies used to avoid and suppress 
trade unions. These include victimizing and dismissing union activists, threatening to 
relocate or close the company, distributing antiunion literature, holding captive 
meetings, ignoring union grievances, creating nonunion consultative structures, 
refusing union access to the workplace, and employing consultants and lawyers in 
avoiding unions (D’Art and Turner 2005; Dolan 2006; Waldron 2004). Of course, 
such tactics are not exclusive to Ireland and have been identified as part of union 
avoidance strategies elsewhere. A number of these tactics will be examined later in 
regard to Ryanair’s union avoidance strategy. 
 
It is all the more significant that the fall in union density and hardening of employer 
opposition to union recognition has occurred during a prolonged period of so-called 
social partnership. Since 1987, a series of centrally negotiated accords has been 
agreed between the “social partners” (principally, government, employers, and trade 
unions but also involving groups representing farming and community/voluntary 
interests). These agreements deal not only with pay but also with a range of economic 
and social policy issues, such as taxation, health care, welfare, and employment. 
Clearly, trade union involvement in the negotiation and implementation of such 
agreements has afforded organized labor considerable influence over economic and 
social policy. However, union involvement in the agreements has done little to stem 
the decline in union density or the growth of union avoidance at enterprise level: 
 
While national social partnership agreements have provided unions with “a 
place in the sun” and enhanced their influence over government macro-
economic strategy and social policy decision-making, the decline in union 
density continues, particularly in the private sector, as unions confront 
significant obstacles to organization in new, expanding sectors of the 
economy. (Geary 2006, 5)  
 
A more specific and defining characteristic of the Irish context is the absence of laws 
regulating trade union recognition and a lack of involvement by the civil courts (High 
Court and Supreme Court) in resolving union recognition disputes. This is because the 
conventional Irish approach of dealing with the union–employer relationship was 
based on “voluntarism,” meaning minimum intervention by the law or third parties 
(including the State). Thus, recognition disputes were traditionally resolved through a 
trial of strength, such as strikes, or by referral to the Labour Court—not a court but a 
State body composed of employer and worker representatives that resolves labor 
disputes, usually through non-binding recommendations (cf. Gunnigle, O’Sullivan, 
and Kinsella 2002). However, recent years have seen a shift away from voluntarism, 
due in part to trade union unrest over the growing incidence of union avoidance and 
declining union density.  
 
Faced with mounting difficulties in securing union recognition, the labor movement 
used the social partnership process to secure legislation to facilitate union recognition. 
This eventually led to the introduction of the Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute 
Resolution and the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001 (amended in 2004). 
This legislation appears confusing in its objectives and role, because disputes can be 
referred under it only where the employer does not engage in collective bargaining, 
yet the law does not provide for statutory union recognition as an outcome. 
Unsurprisingly, the law has been criticized for not providing an effective mechanism 
for securing union recognition (cf. D’Art and Turner 2003). The only issues that the 
legislation does address are terms and conditions of employment, dispute resolution, 
and disciplinary procedures. Critically, the legislation gives the Labour Court the 
power to issue binding decisions on these issues, so, for example, it could set the pay 
and conditions of employees in a dispute. It is this aspect of the law that indicates a 
move away from voluntarism and has been labelled by employers, including Ryanair, 
as a “back door” route to union recognition. 
 
Ryanair Plc. 
Ryanair is an Irish-owned airline that was established in 1985 by the Ryan family to 
compete with Aer Lingus and British Airways on the Ireland–U.K. routes. By1990, 
Ryanair had losses of IR£20million. It restructured and sent its current chief 
executive, Michael O’Leary, to Dallas to meet Southwest Airline executives. O’Leary 
subsequently brought back a business model based on Southwest Airline’s “low-fares/ 
no-frills” template, though in a somewhat sharper form (e.g., charging for soft drinks). 
The company relaunched itself under the new model and became a public company in 
1997. Ryanair’s business approach has all the well-documented characteristics of low-
cost carriers, and its passenger numbers, earnings, and profit figures illustrate the 
success of the business model (cf. Creaton 2005; Strategic Direction 2006). Based on 
passenger numbers, in 2005, Ryanair was the fourteenth-largest airline in the world 
and the fifth-largest in Europe. It flew 31 million passengers and had revenues of $1.7 
billion, up 20 percent over 2004. Over 15 percent of its revenue was derived from 
sources other than ticket sales (Maier 2006). Ryanair’s low-cost business model has 
been more successful than that of its “mentor,” Southwest Airlines, as indicated by 
the former’s 22 percent net profit margin compared to the latter’s 7.2 percent margin. 
Alamdari and Fagan (2005) find that profitability of low-cost carriers may be related 
to the extent of similarity with the original Southwest Airlines business model. 
Interestingly, they concluded that Ryanair’s model was closest and that it was the 
world’s most profitable low-cost carrier.  
 
Much of the publicity, praise, and criticism Ryanair draws is often targeted at chief 
executive Michael O’Leary due to his outspokenness and strong public image. For 
example, he has been quoted as calling the European Commission “morons,” British 
Airways “expensive b******,” and travel agents as “f******” who should be “taken 
out and shot” (A. Clark 2005). Such is the dominance of Michael O’Leary within 
Ryanair that in interviews with trade union officials for this article, they often referred 
to he instead of Ryanair or the company.  
 
Trade Unions with Membership in Ryanair 
In Ireland, two trade unions have been at the center of confrontations with Ryanair. 
The Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU) is the largest 
trade union in Ireland. It represents the majority of catering, cleaning, clerical, and 
operative staff in the country’s other main airline, Aer Lingus. As in many other 
countries, there is a separate trade union for pilots. The IALPA was formed in 1946 
by a group of Aer Lingus pilots. The IALPA draws its one thousand members from 
six Irish airlines. It claims that 85 percent or more of full-time Ryanair pilots in 
Ireland are members. The IALPA is now part of the much larger Irish Municipal 
Public and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT), a fifty-five-thousand strong union that 
predominantly represents public service employees. 
 
Labor Practices in Ryanair 
Barrett (2004, 93) argues, “The most significant contribution to the Ryanair low cost 
base comes from its labour productivity.” Lower labor costs and significant labor 
productivity from the thirty-seven hundred staff members have been achieved in a 
number of ways. First, Ryanair has a high passenger–to–staff member ratio (Table 1). 
Second, it contracts out services to specialist operators, such as catering and aircraft 
maintenance. Third, productivity is increased through staff multitasking; for example, 
cabin crew “tidy up” between flights (Kangis and O’Reilly 2003). Fourth, part of the 
pay of flying crew is performance related; for example, cabin crew receive 
commission for selling duty-free goods during flights (Kangis and O’Reilly 2003). 
Fifth, Ryanair’s cost cutting extends to crew’s paying for their own training, 
uniforms, and meals and head office staff’s supplying their own pens and not charging 
their mobile phones at work (A. Clark 2005). Last, Ryanair staff own 130 million 
shares in the company, providing an incentive for greater labor productivity. 
 
The IALPA is critical of the practice of cabin crew’s paying for their training, not 
only in principle but also because it has significant implications for cabin crew 
employed from central and eastern European countries. The union argues that such 
staff would have to take loans of approximately € 3,000 to € 5,000 (approximately 
US$4,000 to US$6,680) to pay for the training, thereby becoming a form of 
“indentured labor” that “could not afford to walk out after a week because they have a 
loan” (IALPA union official, interview). Once crew’s training period is finished, the 
union claims that they are often not directly employed by Ryanair but by an agency. 
The union also criticized what they suggested was Ryanair’s policy of a deliberate 
high turnover of staff. The union hypothesized on the reasons for such a practice:  
Let’s say you take cabin crew in, get a year/18 months out of them, they 
haven’t moved up an incremental scale if there were an incremental scale. 
They are, by and large, too young to be in the pension scheme so [Ryanair] is 
not going to incur a pension cost. They’re certainly not going to become 
established and secure and start banging on about their rights and joining trade 
unions and anything like that so [Ryanair] has a deliberate strategy of keeping 
people for a short period of time, working them extremely hard then turn them 
over again. (IALPA union official, interview) 
 
Table 1: Number of Passengers per Staff Member in Selected Airlines, 2003 
Airline Number of Passengers per 
Flight Staff Member 
Ryanair 10,050 
Easyjet  6,293 
Aer Lingus  1,540 
Lufthansa  1,181 
German Wings  1,000 
Iberia  978 
Alitalia  959 
SAS  898 
British Airways  758 
Source: Barrett (2004). 
 
Ryanair Avoidance and Suppression of Trade Unions 
 
Crushing SIPTU 
Ryanair’s first major battle with a trade union in Ireland began in 1997, when SIPTU 
requested improved pay and conditions and union recognition on behalf of thirty-nine 
ground-handling agents in its membership in Dublin Airport. Ryanair refused 
SIPTU’s demands. As the dispute continued into 1998, a series of work stoppages and 
demonstrations were undertaken by SIPTU. Ryanair cancelled airside security 
clearances of the ground-handling agents after it claimed the workers had intimidated 
staff and passengers. As the dispute progressed, the Taoiseach (prime minister), Bertie 
Ahern, encouraged Ryanair to recognize the union. He said that while he respected 
the decisions of some global firms to offer “first-class conditions to operate 
alternatives acceptable to their workforces, other things being equal, it is preferable 
that larger companies can accommodate the presence of trade unions” (Sheehan 
1998a). 
 
SIPTU continued to engage in industrial action, leading to the closure of Dublin 
airport on March 7. The next day, an enquiry team established by the government 
formulated proposals to reopen the airport, which SIPTU and Ryanair accepted. 
Subsequently, this team produced a report on the dispute. At the request of Ryanair 
management, the team met with sixteen groups of employees and found that the 
majority had a negative attitude toward trade union organization, and some disputed 
the right of a minority to join a union. They believed that unionization would decrease 
flexibility and would be unlikely to result in significant enhancement of pay and 
benefits (Flynn and McAuley 1998). It is noteworthy that the meetings were held at 
the request of Ryanair, though the report did not explicitly state how the employees 
were selected. In addition, the airline’s legal advisor and/or head of personnel 
attended almost all the meetings. 
 
The enquiry team commissioned a comparison of pay across a number of airlines and 
disagreed with Ryanair claims that its ground-handling agents earned more money, 
had more time off, and had better benefits than their counterparts in other airlines. The 
report encouraged the company to allow union representation for workers in 
grievance and disciplinary situations. SIPTU alleged that three probationary 
employees had been victimized when their jobs were terminated following their 
involvement in the strike. The enquiry team agreed that their participation in the 
dispute might have been a “consideration” taken into account by Ryanair in deciding 
not to offer them permanent employment. Unsurprisingly, Ryanair disagreed with the 
findings of the pay comparison and the enquiry team. The company challenged the 
pay comparison in the High Court, claiming it contained manifest errors and was 
unreasonable and irrational. However, the challenge failed because the High Court 
said that the report had not affected Ryanair’s legal rights. 
 
There were two important consequences of the strike. The first was that Ryanair did 
not concede to any of SIPTU’s demands and continued to remain nonunion. The 
second is that it appears that SIPTU’s inability to “break” Ryanair sent out a strong 
message to other unions that the strike, as the traditional union weapon, was not 
effective against the company. During the strike, Sheehan (1998b) questioned the 
wisdom of the union’s taking on Ryanair:  
Given the high stakes involved, at a national level, it is at least arguable that 
the union picked the wrong company to do battle with. Ryanair’s track record 
on the issue of union recognition has been well documented. 
Sheehan’s skepticism now seems well placed. Since the strike, there has been no 
industrial action taken against Ryanair, and SIPTU has played a less public and vocal 
role in representing employees. Union sources estimate that SIPTU’s membership 
within Ryanair is less than one hundred. Since the strike, the pilots union, IALPA, has 
taken the lead in organized labor’s confrontations. 
 
Ryanair and Its Pilots: The Retraining Dispute 
Since 2004, IALPA has been engaged in a dispute with Ryanair over training. Ryanair 
offered to train pilots on new aircraft on two conditions: no union recognition and no 
claims against the company under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001–2004. If the 
company were forced to engage in collective bargaining with a union within five 
years, each pilot would be liable to pay back the training costs to the company (€ 
15,000, or US$20,000). In addition, if the pilots did not accept the training offer, they 
either would be dismissed or would have to pay the training fees. The IALPA claims 
that originally, pilots were provided with training of the new aircraft for free, but 
when pilots started to leave Ryanair after receiving training, the company began to 
place a bond on them. The union claims that the cost of retraining was first set at 
approximately €2,500, then at € 3,000, then € 8,000, then €15,000, each of which the 
union claims was “just a figment of their imagination, they can create whatever costs 
they want” (IALPA union official, interview).  
 
In 2005, the pilots paid the € 15,000 on union advice. The union and employees 
subsequently took a case against Ryanair to the High Court claiming a breach of their 
constitutional right to form and join unions and of their rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In response, Ryanair argued that there was no 
obligation on it to recognize a union. The High Court, however, rejected Ryanair’s 
arguments and ordered it to pay legal costs, estimated at over €1 million (Irish Times 
2006). The union has since submitted a claim to the Labour Court for a refund of the 
training monies paid. The union argues that the dispute somewhat backfired on 
Ryanair because “what they have done is they have cemented these pilots together… 
We didn’t cement them together, they cemented them together” (IALPA union 
official, interview). 
 
In addition to the High Court case, Ryanair pilots submitted two hundred claims of 
victimization under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001–2004. They claimed that the 
conditions attached to the retraining amounted to victimization. Ryanair, though, 
challenged the authority of the State dispute resolution body involved, the Rights 
Commissioners, to carry out the investigations. It is awaiting a hearing in the High 
Court. Should a Rights Commissioner hear the claims of victimization and find in 
favor of the employees, IALPA predicted that the cases “would expose Ryanair to 
claims of up to € 50 million and further legal costs” (Sheehan 2005). It has been 
suggested that if such costs were incurred by the company, “it might concentrate a 
few minds” within Ryanair management (IALPA union official, interview). However, 
there is no guarantee that the High Court will allow the Rights Commissioners to 
investigate the pilots’ claims, particularly given Ryanair’s success in a separate case 
in the Supreme Court.  
 
The background to the Supreme Court case lies in IALPA’s pursuing another claim 
on the retraining dispute under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001–2004 to the Labour 
Court. As noted earlier, in order for a case to be referred under these Industrial 
Relations Acts, it must not be the practice of the employer to engage in collective 
bargaining. Ryanair claimed that collective bargaining did exist in the form of 
employee representative committees, through which consultation took place with 
employee representatives. Thus, the company argued that the Labour Court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the union’s case. IALPA argued that while it used to elect 
members to the committees in the 1990s, this was no longer the case. The union 
claimed that the typical committee would work in the following way: Management 
would choose the employee representative, a meeting would be called in which 
management would tell the employee representative of forthcoming changes to terms 
and conditions of employment, the meeting would end, and a letter would be 
circulated to staff informing them of the “agreement” that had been reached (IALPA 
union official, interview). 
 
Unsurprisingly, IALPA argued that the committees were not collective bargaining 
fora in any meaningful sense of the word, since nominees are chosen by management, 
there are no elections, a person can be a member for only two consecutive years (so 
there is no stability), and committees do not set their own rules (IALPA union official, 
interview). The Labour Court agreed with IALPA that the committees did not have 
the essential characteristics of collective bargaining and thus—critically— that it 
could hear the case. Ryanair then went to the High Court, seeking to quash the 
decision of the Labour Court, but were unsuccessful. Ryanair appealed to the 
Supreme Court, and in 2007, it ruled in favor of Ryanair and decided that the Labour 
Court should rehear the case.  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision has potentially catastrophic consequences, not just for 
IALPA but also for the union movement as a whole. These arise from two parts of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. The first is the Court’s view that Ryanair’s employee 
representative committees could be regarded as a form of collective bargaining, even 
though unions did not participate on them. This is significant, as it means that 
companies can now use nonunion representative committees to avoid the new 
Industrial Relations Acts, rendering the legislation effectively redundant. The second 
significant part of the Supreme Court’s decision was a comment made by the Court 
that “as a matter of law, Ryanair is perfectly entitled not to deal with trade unions nor 
can a law be passed compelling it to do so” (emphasis added; Ryanair v. The Labour 
Court 2007). While Ryanair is entitled to operate without recognizing unions, this is 
the first time that the Supreme Court has suggested that a union recognition law 
cannot be passed. The primary reason the social partners have not introduced union 
recognition legislation to date has been because of the feared effects of statutory 
union recognition on foreign direct investment into Ireland. At no stage have the 
social partners articulated a view that they could not introduce statutory union 
recognition legislation. 
 
Ryanair and Its Pilots: The REPA Dispute  
In addition to using industrial relations legislation and the civil courts, the pilots union 
has been involved in a more innovative method of challenging Ryanair, through the 
creation of the Ryanair European Pilots Association (REPA). It was formed in 2004 
with the support of the IALPA, the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA), and 
the European Cockpit Association, “with a view to ensuring that Ryanair pilot 
concerns will be taken seriously” (www.repaweb.org). The REPA does not formally 
represent its members. Rather, its primary activity is to operate a Web site through 
which Ryanair pilots can anonymously communicate with each other under different 
code names chosen by the pilots. Two code names that have been used are 
“ihateryanair” and “cantfly, wontfly.” Ryanair’s response to the REPA Web site was 
aggressive, claiming the site was being used to intimidate pilots not to sign up to the 
retraining offer discussed earlier. In an attempt to force REPA to reveal the identities 
behind the code names, Ryanair initiated proceedings in the High Court and called the 
police to investigate. However, the High Court rejected Ryanair’s claims and 
concluded that pilots had not been bullied, intimidated, or isolated by other pilots or 
unions. In fact, the High Court turned the bullying allegation on Ryanair, when it 
described the conditions attached to the retraining of pilots as “most onerous” 
conditions that “bore all the hallmarks of oppression” (Irish Times 2006). 
 
Ryanair and Its Pilots: Pay Raises for Nonunion Staff 
In 2005, Ryanair announced a 3 percent pay raise but only to employees who did not 
negotiate through unions. European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) official 
Erika Young said that the selective increase  
 
borders almost on blackmail. Inferring that affiliation to a trade union is 
detrimental to the company’s profits is extremely misleading, given the 
success of other unionised low-fares and network carriers. (AFX News 
Limited 2005)  
 
Ryanair personnel director Eddie Wilson said the increase applied to all staff who 
participated in the “direct negotiations” with the company, and as only Dublin-based 
pilots did not do so, they were left out. He argued that the pay increase “reinforces the 
strength of Ryanair’s model whereby people negotiate directly with the company and 
as a result enjoy better pay and conditions than our low-pay unionised competitors” 
(AFX News Limited 2005). 
 
Ryanair and Trade Unions in Europe 
Ryanair’s relationship with trade unions in other parts of Europe has been just as 
hostile as with Irish unions. In 2001, BALPA sought union recognition from Ryanair 
after a successful recognition campaign at Easyjet. BALPA was convinced that it had 
enough members in the United Kingdom to be successful and took a case to the 
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC), which adjudicates on statutory union 
recognition applications. BALPA was surprised when the CAC decided that BALPA 
had just 43.2 percent of pilot membership and that a secret postal ballot would be 
conducted. The ballot resulted in a crushing defeat for BALPA, as 81 percent voted 
against recognizing the union. Following the ballot, Ryanair stated, “Since BALPA 
were recently granted recognition in Easyjet, Ryanair is now the only U.K. airline 
where the pilots (having voted in a secret ballot) have rejected union recognition” 
(Sheehan, 2001). Sheehan (2001) argued that the loss of the ballot by BALPA was no 
surprise, given the union’s density level within the bargaining unit at the time of the 
vote, but what was surprising was the strength of the vote against recognition. IALPA 
has suggested that BALPA lost by such a wide margin because it was unprepared for 
the aggressiveness of Ryanair. For example, it was suggested that the company 
expanded the electorate by bringing in agency pilots and telling them “to vote no or 
they all collectively would be fired” (IALPA union official, interview).  
 
In addition to seeking recognition and establishing the REPA, European trade unions 
have been involved in court actions, demonstrations, and warnings to Ryanair job 
applicants. In Norway, the Norwegian Union of Commerce and Office Employees 
(NUCOE) and cabin crew union Norsk Kabinforening attended a Ryanair recruitment 
drive in 2005. The unions told potential candidates about poor working conditions and 
social practices at Ryanair and encouraged them to join a union (ITF 2005). In 
Belgium, a demonstration took place outside the Labour Court at Charleroi involving 
a number of unions and union activists from France, Spain, and Italy. The 
demonstration was in support of three former Ryanair employees who had lost their 
jobs following a one-year trial period. They subsequently took a case against Ryanair 
that had potentially significant implications because it centered on the fact that the 
three former employees were based in Belgium but were on Irish contracts of 
employment. The demonstrating unions demanded that the Charleroi Labour Court 
guarantee the three dismissed workers all their social rights according to Belgian law. 
In addition, the unions sought the following: union recognition by Ryanair in all 
countries where it employs personnel, a study of the economic and social 
consequences of the low-cost model by the European Parliament, and legislation by 
the European Commission clarifying the situation regarding employment contracts for 
air crew (Harper 2003). While none of these objectives was attained, the Belgian 
court concluded that Belgian labor law should take precedence because that was the 
country in which the former Ryanair employees habitually worked. Broughton (2005, 
20) argued that the decision was significant, as it was “the first instance of the place 
of employment being used as the principal criterion for determining which law is 
applicable to an airline’s workers.”  
 
Protests were also organized by the ITF in 2004, when it launched the “Ryan Be Fair” 
campaign. The aim of the protest and the campaign was to “highlight the need for 
Ryanair to recognise unions if the airline’s employees so desire” (ITF 2004). In 
addition, the ITF has a Ryan Be Fair Web site, through which Ryanair workers and 
the public can sign an “Appeal for Fairness.” The appeal made by the ITF (2004) is 
that “employees shall have the right to join or not to join a trade union of their choice 
free from coercion and victimisation” and “no employee shall be fired, harassed or 
intimidated, disciplined or subjected to surveillance in relation to any union activity or 
union position held.” ITF general secretary David Cockroft commented,  
 
This is a new campaign tool for an old problem. For as long as there’s been 
trade unions, there’s been employers who try to bully workers away from 
them. We’re here to find ways to prevent this. Ryanair claims it’s not 




Ryanair has consistently argued that it is not antiunion. Michael O’Leary has said he 
would be happy to negotiate with unions if the majority of the company’s employees 
were members. However, the claim of not being antiunion falls in the face of 
extensive evidence of union suppression. The IALPA has rubbished Ryanair claims 
that it would be amenable to negotiating with unions if membership were high. It 
argues, “Anybody that attempts to organise a union or even makes noises about it has 
a short shelf life” (IALPA union official, interview). However, the union also claims 
that pilot union activists tend to have a longer “shelf life” because so many pilots are 
unionized and it would be difficult for Ryanair to “get rid” of them all. Similar to 
IALPA, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) did not believe that Ryanair 
would negotiate with trade unions. It pointed to the fact that “the vast majority of the 
pilots based in Ireland are members of IALPA and [Ryanair] will not speak to 
IALPA” (ICTU union official, interview). ICTU was of the view that Ryanair is 
scared that if it concedes ground to one employee group, other groups would seek to 
be represented by unions. 
 
Ryanair’s policy of vehement opposition to trade unions derives in large measure 
from its business model, which seeks to establish competitive advantage via extreme 
cost-cutting measures, going further than other low-cost airlines. The company has 
stated its belief that there is a link between union avoidance and maintaining low costs 
and flexibility: 
 
If [Ryanair] were forced to recognise SIPTU by a minority of its employees, it 
will be forced out of business by an increasing number of competitors. The 
scope for growth in employment will be diminished and jobs will be lost as the 
unions seek to replicate the inefficient work practices and attitudes which 
prevail at Dublin Airport, within Ryanair. (quoted in Flynn and McAuley 
1998, 31) 
 
Thus, we can identify Ryanair’s strategy of aligning its low-cost business model with 
its industrial relations strategy. The link between companies’ business models and 
industrial relations strategies is hardly new, but considerable attention has been paid 
to such links in so-called high-road employments, particularly, multinational 
companies with sophisticated human resources policies. Ryanair, in contrast, is an 
example of a “low-road” employment, where its business model directly influences its 
industrial relations approach to the detriment of employees. The company’s 
commercial success is likely to make it a role model for other low-cost airlines, which 
may also replicate Ryanair’s industrial relations practices.  
 
In addition to chasing the bottom line, we feel that Ryanair’s antiunion stance is 
heavily influenced by Michael O’Leary. His views on unions reflects his free-market 
ideology, which, according to IALPA and ICTU, is also extremely dominant in the 
thinking of company management. ICTU was of the view that Ryanair’s behaviour “is 
from another age . . . and it seems largely to be driven by O’Leary himself. 
It’s very much his view of the world” (ICTU union official, interview). Ryanair’s 
adoption of extreme cost leadership allied to the fact that its chief executive has 
embraced a high profile renders it a particular variant of low-cost provision in the 
airline sector and one that at least some other low-cost carriers are likely to embrace. 
Nor is its influence likely to stop there. A number of older, highly unionized airlines 
have recently embraced aspects of the low-cost business model (e.g., reduced staffing, 
lower pay and benefits) in the face of deregulation and more intense competition (cf. 
Strategic Direction 2006; Harvey and Turnbull 2002). By following Ryanair, other 
airlines have legitimized Ryanair’s business model and, concomitantly, its nonunion 
status. 
 
Ryanair’s nonunion status and the labor practices it employs exist despite extensive 
employment legislation and Ireland’s well-documented national social partnership 
system. However, this is not necessarily surprising. While social partnership is 
extensive at the national level between the government, trade unions, and employer 
organizations, a myriad of employer approaches to trade unions exists at the 
enterprise level. Indeed, government objectives that national-level partnership would 
be mirrored by enterprise-level partnership have not transpired. There is no 
mechanism within the social partnership system to force or persuade employers to 
facilitate trade unions. To do so would be difficult, given continuing trade union 
decline in the private sector and a fear among policy makers and the social partners 
that forcing employers to pursue a prounion stance would be detrimental to Ireland’s 
business environment. While ICTU contends that Ryanair’s behavior is from “another 
age,” it cannot simply be considered a “rogue” employer in terms of union avoidance. 
Indeed, union avoidance is now commonplace among many large private sector 
employers. What differentiates Ryanair from many other nonunion companies is that 
union avoidance represents a critical factor in its business model, and it commits a 
high level of resources to union avoidance. This is most clearly manifested in the 
lengths the company has gone to challenge the legitimacy of the State dispute 
resolution machinery. Ryanair’s recent victory in the Supreme Court has already 
paved the way for other nonunion companies to challenge previous Labour Court 
decisions under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001–2004 (cf. Higgins 2007). The 
company is also distinguished by the fact that it has been strongly pursued by a trade 
union, while other nonunion companies do not get the same union attention, primarily 
because trade unions find it difficult to get their foot in the door and some non-union 
companies, typically multinationals, have a reputation of providing attractive pay and 
conditions (cf. Gunnigle, O’Sullivan, and Kinsella 2002).  
 
It is clear that IALPA has pursued a different strategy to SIPTU. While SIPTU used 
the traditional union weapon of the strike, IALPA has so far refrained from using 
industrial action and has instead used industrial relations legislation as well as the 
civil courts. The difference in strategies can be attributed to a number of reasons. 
First, industrial action was an unsuccessful strategy for SIPTU. Second, the current 
size and geographical spread of the airline dilutes the possible effects of industrial 
action in one country. IALPA officials regard the 1998 strike as a missed opportunity 
because Ryanair was still small and most of its business was located in Ireland. They 
believe that to inflict comparable damage on the company today would be a much 
more difficult task since Ryanair is bigger and stronger and its operations across 
Europe are much more diffuse. Third, IALPA is not a traditional union with 
experience of industrial action. It considers itself to have industrial and professional 
roles, such as representing the technical and safety interests on behalf of all Irish 
commercial pilots. In addition, and more remarkably, IALPA claims that it does not 
actually seek recognition from Ryanair, claiming it is “delighted not to be recognized” 
(IALPA union official, interview). The union believes that by not seeking recognition 
and by using alternatives to industrial action such as legislation and the civil courts, 
Ryanair is  
 
forced into an independent arena where their performance is assessed, where 
the truthfulness of their statements can be assessed, where evidence can be 
read dispassionately as opposed to propaganda. (IALPA union official, 
interview)  
 
The union suggests that seeking union recognition would only serve the company’s 
interests. One official explained,  
 
If you watch [Michael O’Leary] any time with us, recognition is one of two or 
three themes he laces into the conversation all the time and creates an 
impression about the mindless IALPA troublemakers seeking a thing called 
recognition. So he then sets up a false battle which he is then going to resist. 
(IALPA union official, interview)  
 
IALPA’s claim that it does not want union recognition from Ryanair contrasts the 
prevailing view that all unions seek recognition in order to adequately protect their 
members’ interests. Thus, the non-traditional union posits an alternative strategy to 
deal with a nonunion employer. Despite assertions that it does not want recognition, it 
would, however, be difficult to envisage the union refusing offers of dialogue with the 
company, if these were in good faith.  
 
The substantial use of the legal system by both Ryanair and IALPA deviates from the 
traditional voluntarist approach to industrial relations in Ireland. It appears that the 
legal system serves the purposes of both the company and union. The company can 
delay the possible consequences of the Industrial Relations Acts 2001–2004 by 
challenging each step of the process involved. Furthermore, by dragging out the 
process through legal challenges, Ryanair would probably hope that employees feel 
more inclined to give up. ICTU commented that Ryanair has  
 
calculated that it’s worth spending the money on the legal system as opposed 
to having to not surrender but having to accept that they have responsibility to 
deal collectively with the pilots union at this point. That’s a concern for us, 
that they would be able to string out the process or have the potential to string 
out the process to the point where people become frustrated and decide it’s not 
worth it anymore. (ICTU union official, interview) 
 
Similarly, IALPA believes that Ryanair’s court cases are “all means of keeping us 
busy, the danger of serious legal costs and the pressurizing of individuals” (IALPA 
union official, interview). Blyton et al. (2001, 459) note that civil aviation unions still 
have considerable power resources. IALPA, though, with a large proportion of pilots 
in its membership and seemingly significant resources, given the number of court 
actions it has taken against Ryanair, is not satisfied that the needs of its members have 
been adequately addressed. 
 
As for the medium-term future of relations between Ryanair and IALPA, it is likely 
that the courts and dispute resolution institutions will remain the primary 
battleground. In interviews, union officials were hopeful that another victory against 
Ryanair in ongoing claims would cost the airline a significant amount of money and 
the union “would maybe look like people that a deal would have to be done with” 
(IALPA union official, interview). However, Ryanair’s win in the Supreme Court has 
dealt a serious blow to IALPA’s optimism. In regard to the long-term future, IALPA 
believes that as industrial action in Ireland alone would have limited effects on the 
company, what is needed is the development of cross-border union cooperation, 
because it is “impossible to deal with an employer like Ryanair unless you have the 
ability to organize but then to back that up with industrial action on a European-wide 
basis” (IALPA union official, interview). IALPA has argued that it needs  
 
a parallel process to freedom of capital, freedom of movement and so on. We 
actually need freedom to operate as a trade union transnationally… Ryanair 
doesn’t have to jump through hoops if it wants to establish a base in Poland. 
It’s an EU airline and it’s entitled to operate in any EU destination. We would 
take the view that any member of ours or any other pilots union should be free 
to take industrial action anywhere in Europe on the basis of the rules apply in 
the State in which we’re based. (IALPA union official, interview) 
 
An example of cross-border union cooperation is the REPA Web site. REPA claims 
that it was necessary because “it was recognised that the existing model of a 
representative body is no longer valid and required updating into a pan-European 
organisation” (www.repaweb.org). The chairman of BALPA, Captain Mervyn 
Granshaw, argued that a cross-country organization was needed, “as today’s markets 
require more than the traditional response of sovereign trade unions” (European 
Cockpit Association 2004). While the Web site seems useful as an avenue through 
which union members across countries can share experiences, it has not, as yet, 
resulted in concerted, organized collective action. The existence of the Web site itself 
is an indication of the inability of member pilots to voice concerns without the use of 
code names. 
 
The comments made by the IALPA on the need for cross-border union action against 
Ryanair resonate with Royle’s (2002, 276) comments that multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are able to operate “to some extent independently of regulatory systems.” 
The growth in neoliberalism internationally has allowed companies like Ryanair to 
push its business strategy to the detriment of trade unions, as evidenced by Ryanair’s 
takeover of Buzz airline in the United Kingdom and its subsequent refusal to 
acknowledge the established trade unions in Buzz. There is growing literature on the 
extent to which European business systems have accommodated MNCs. 
I. Clark et al. (2005, 514) argue that industrial democracy and the enforcement of 
employment rights involves cost to the EU consumer and that “we all like the idea of 
workers in the EU being well treated… but like the idea of paying for it less so.” Such 
realities have filtered through to the national business systems, which Clark et al. 
suggest are leaning toward economic efficiency rather than industrial democracy. In 
the Irish context, it has been argued that Ireland has effectively restructured some of 
its business systems to accommodate the industrial relations approaches of MNCs, 
particularly, their desire to avoid trade unions (Gunnigle, Collings, and Morley 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen that a number of factors have contributed to the adoption of Ryanair’s 
union suppression strategy, particularly, the free market ideology of its CEO and the 
alignment of its business model and human resources strategy. In addition, we have 
noted that Ireland’s national social partnership model has not inhibited, or attempted 
to inhibit, the development of Ryanair’s staunch antiunion stance. It is clear that 
Ryanair’s union suppression strategy has been successful. While union officials 
interviewed argued that the ground-handling agent dispute had little impact on 
SIPTU’s recognition attempts, SIPTU has not pursued recognition in the interim. 
Whether or not the union considers Ryanair a “lost cause,” SIPTU appears to have 
diverted its attention away from Ryanair. Thus, the only union that appears 
determined to confront Ryanair is IALPA. It should also be borne in mind that IALPA 
represents a minority of high-skilled employees (pilots) who are not as easy to replace 
as other airline workers. Since SIPTU’s withdrawal, the vast majority of Ryanair’s 
lower skilled and lower paid workers are largely at the mercy of unilateral decision 
making, which remains, for the most part, unchallenged. 
 
It is possible that Ryanair’s attitude to trade unions may change if Michael O’Leary 
were to leave or step down as CEO. He announced a retirement date of 2008, but it 
remains to be seen if he will actually step down then. An IALPA official suggested 
that the working lives of employees might improve if a new chief executive sought to 
create order within the company. He believed that “order in the sense of structure, 
reliability, consistency—that is the enemy of exploitation” (IALPA union official, 
interview). Similarly, ICTU considered the possibility that  
 
if Michael O’Leary left Ryanair tomorrow, the company under different 
leadership might have a different view of the world, but certainly the team that 
he has around them down there are very staunch in their views about this 
issue. You could tell just by body language, the way they gave evidence in 
court that this was a religion. (IALPA union official, interview)  
 
However, as any new chief executive would be answerable to shareholders, attempts 
to create consistency or change labor practices may be restricted by the need to 
maintain the currently high profit levels, which O’Leary has delivered. Michael 
O’Leary’s approach to business in general is aptly summed up in the following 
anecdote. The story goes that Michael O’Leary was once asked by a union official 
about “why he was such a bollix,” to which he replied, “It’s nothing personal; it’s just 
bums on seats.” 
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